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Abstract:
Using a 2×2 design, this study incorporates psychological contract theory and
the “good cause norm” to investigate discharge policy information and implied promises of
job security on reactions to the job offer letter. Results indicate that while embedded
implied promises significantly increase perceptions of organizational attraction relative to a
control, they demonstrate no discernable effects on recruit perceptions of organizational
psychological contract obligations. Furthermore, embedded at-will disclaimers, alone or in
combination with implied promises, significantly reduce perceptions of organizational
attractiveness and organizational psychological contract obligations. Implications are discussed
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Introduction 
Attraction of high quality employees continues to be a major concern for most employers 
(Suazo et al. 2009), and there is reason to suspect that the way an employer reacts to 
erosion of the at-will doctrine may affect the firm’s ability to attract employees (Roehling 
and  Wright  2004).  To  date,  several  studies  have  been  conducted  identifying  how 
recruitment-related information sources and characteristics serve as important antecedents 
of organizational attractiveness (Carless 2005; Cober et al. 2003; Mahony et al. 2005). 
Whereas empirical research exists examining the negative influence of termination policy 
communications in early stage recruitment materials (e.g., recruitment brochures; Roehling 
and Winters 2000; Schwoerer and Rosen 1989), very few researchers have investigated 
those factors that influence late-stage job-pursuit processes such as reactions to job offers. 
This relative dearth of research should be of particular interest to human resource 
specialists for a number of reasons. For example, it is likely that a significant portion of 
new hires are not actively exposed to early-stage recruiting materials and are first presented 
with termination policy information only later when extended a job offer letter, within 
which discharge information is embedded. Furthermore, job offer letters are among the 
most  high-profile  documents  produced  by  an  organization,  one  of  the  first  places 
employment  rights  lawyers  look  in  the  event  of  litigation,  and  a  key  area  where 
organizations continue to open themselves up to legal vulnerability (Dale 2006; Wimberley 
2001).  Moreover,  an  offer  of  employment  constitutes  a  key  form  of  organizational 
communication that  can be interpreted by an applicant as a  promise of a reciprocal 
exchange  agreement  (Conway  and  Briner  2005).  Given  the  practical,  legal,  and 
psychological implications of recruits’ reactions to job offer letters, this study seeks to 
shed light on this important, yet under-researched domain by examining the impact of 
discharge policy information embedded within job offers (i.e., implied promises of job 
security and at-will disclaimers) on organizational attractiveness and perceptions of the 
organization’s psychological contract obligations. 
Employment at Will, the Good Cause Norm, and Relational Contracts 
It is common law throughout most of the U.S. that an employee hired for an indefinite period of 
time without an employment contract is terminable at-will by the employer (Rothstein and 
Liebman 2003). The employment at-will doctrine, most prevalent in non-unionized 
organizations, provides that an employer can legally dismiss an employee at any time for 
any reason as long as the dismissal does not violate provisions of a specific statute (e.g., the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act), or, in many states, undermine 
important public policy (e.g., serving jury duty). Under this doctrine, the employee likewise 
has a right to leave the employment relationship at any time (Heaton 2003). 
While most human resource professionals practicing within the United States are very 
familiar with core principles of the at-will concept, many are not aware of the substantial 
differences between our domestic employment laws and those of other countries (Mello 
2004). For example, employment-at-will is rarely recognized internationally. Indeed, as a 
practice, it has been soundly rejected in Mexico, India, and Korea as well as other Anglo- 
system countries such as England, Canada, and Australia. Thus, most countries outside of 
the United States offer significant employee protections that are incompatible with an 
employment-at-will philosophy. This disparity has the potential to pose significant 
problems not only for American multinational companies operating in countries where 
layoffs and terminations are heavily regulated, but also foreign entities operating in 
America. For non-U.S. businesses, the consequences of required at-will communications 
should be well understood by any organization engaging in business transactions involving 
employee staffing (Mello 2004; Posthuma et al. 2006). 
Organizations often incorporate at-will disclaimers in company handbooks, job offer 
letters, and recruitment literature to inform recruits of organizational discharge policy (Kim 
1999; Roehling 2002; Roehling and Wright 2004). Though these disclaimers are used to 
avoid potential costly lawsuits, it has been argued that this impersonal, litigation-oriented 
approach has adverse effects on the formation of the employment relationship (Roehling 
and Wright 2004). For example, researchers have found the use of employment at-will 
disclaimers negatively affects job seekers evaluation of organizational attractiveness and 
willingness to sign up for an interview (Roehling and Winters 2000; Schwoerer and Rosen 
1989). Research indicates that at-will disclaimers may lead to these negative outcomes as a 
result of a violation of the “good cause” norm (Roehling 2002; Wayland et al. 1993). 
The good cause norm is a societal-level norm that reflects the belief that all individuals are 
fundamentally endowed with dignity and should thus be treated fairly and respectfully. As such, 
organizations are obligated to provide good reasons for employee termination, regardless of the 
employer’s formally-stated policy. These theoretical assertions have received much empirical 
support (for a review, see Roehling 2002) and have been shown to influence employee 
behavior cross-culturally (Grimmer and Oddy 2007; Westwood et al. 2001). 
As noted by human resources management researchers, the good cause norm is routinely 
found in the employee-employer exchange, however, in this narrower context it is made manifest 
in the form of a psychological contract (Roehling 2002; Roehling and Boswell 2004; Roehling 
and Wright 2004). According to psychological contract theory, employee perceptions of the 
organization’s explicitly and implicitly stated promises give rise to expectations which serve as 
the foundation of psychological contract formation (Robinson and Rousseau 1994; Rousseau 
1990, 1995). Psychological contracts are further characterized as schemas shaped in an 
ongoing way by internal and external factors  that help individuals make sense of the 
employment relationship (Rousseau 2001). Thus, the psychological contract represents one’s 
belief regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between oneself 
and the organization. The psychological contract emerges as one garners new information 
regarding the employment relationship, and comes to believe that he/she has been promised 
some form of future return, creating a psychological obligation to reciprocate in kind in the 
form of effort, commitment, and loyalty (Rousseau 1990, 1995, 2001). 
Importantly, researchers have differentiated between two types of psychological 
contracts: transactional psychological contracts and relational psychological contracts 
(Rousseau 1990, 1995). A relational contract is defined as broad, amorphous, long-term, 
non-quantifiable, and subjectively understood by the parties to the exchange (Miles and 
Snow 1980; Morrison and Robinson 1997). The good cause norm would be an example of 
a relational contract. In contrast, transactional contracts involve highly specific, easily- 
quantified exchanges of narrow scope and duration with terms and conditions that are likely 
to be publicly available (e.g. through a written contract or, in the absence of a contract, an 
employment at will policy; Robinson et al. 1994; Rousseau and Parks 1993). 
Employment at Will and Employee Outcomes 
Recently, human resource management scholars have noted that while the predominant 
pattern in organizations over the past 20 years has been a shift toward greater emphasis on 
shorter-term, transactional psychological contracts (Conway and Briner 2005; Suazo et al. 
2009), researchers have also found that attitudinal and/or behavioral responses to 
psychological contract breaches are more pronounced for relational psychological contracts 
(Conway and Briner 2005; Grimmer and Oddy 2007). These results indicate that HR 
researchers and practitioners would do well to understand the mechanisms for creating, and 
the results of breaching, relational psychological contracts. 
 
 
Much research has suggested that the organization plays a key role in the formation of 
relational psychological contracts (Conway and Briner 2005; Guzzo and Noonan 1994; 
Sparrow 2000). More specifically, any form of HR-related organizational communication 
(e.g., recruitment materials or personnel manuals) made by any member of the organization 
(e.g., recruiter or a manager) can be interpreted as a promise by a potential employee and 
serve as a basis for a broad relational contract that serves socio-emotional needs. In the 
recruitment context, the employer and recruit discuss what they each can offer in the 
prospective employment relationship. During this time, the organization attempts to entice 
and attract the recruit by projecting the most favorable image possible. In doing so, any 
communications made to the recruit serve as not only the basis for the terms and conditions 
of employment, but also as promises upon which relational psychological contracts are 
built. During this discourse, statements made by agents of the organization, no matter how 
informal and imprecise, may later be remembered as promises and give rise to expectations 
of organizational obligations to the employee. In turn, these perceptions influence the 
degree to which recruits reciprocate by adjusting their own obligations to their employer 
and levels of attraction (Robinson and Rousseau 1994). 
Thus, during recruitment, the good cause norm informs potential employees that 
freedom from arbitrary discharge is a fundamental right and that employers who fail to 
provide good reasons for discharge are in violation of an important social obligation 
(Roehling 2002). As a relational contract, the good cause norm assures recruits that hard 
work and loyalty will be exchanged for job security. Accordingly, violating the good cause 
norm during discharge has been found to affect perceptions of fairness (Rousseau and 
Anton 1991) as well as perceptions of organizational attractiveness and intentions to pursue 
job opportunities during recruitment (Schmedeman and McLean-Parks 1994). 
However, to date, no one has examined the effects of the inclusion of an at-will 
disclaimer during late-stage recruitment (i.e., in a job-offer letter). Furthermore, no one has 
examined the effects of an at-will disclaimer on prospective employees’ perceived 
organizational psychological contract obligations. As noted above, both empirical and 
theoretical work indicates that psychological contract breach resulting from the use of at-will 
disclaimers should disrupt perceptions of organizational obligation to reciprocate treatment in 
kind. Thus, it is likely that their presence in a job offer letter will also result in lower levels of 
organizational attractiveness and perceptions of organizational psychological contract 
obligations. Based on the above, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1a:   The presence of an at-will disclaimer will decrease levels of organizational 
attractiveness relative to a control condition. 
Hypothesis 1b:   The presence of an at-will disclaimer will decrease levels of psychological 
contract obligations relative to a control condition. 
 
Implied Promises and Employee Outcomes 
 
While organizations often disseminate discharge information through the use of at-will 
disclaimers, they also rely on organization-generated materials (i.e., employee handbooks, 
personnel manuals, job-offer letters) to convey promissory language meant to enhance 
recruits’ perception of job security. Examples of this type of language can be seen in 
provisions that indicate an employer will follow specific procedures prior to disciplining or 
terminating an employee, a suggestion that long-term employment may follow a 
probationary period, or communication of the organization’s no-layoff policy (Arthur 
2006; Muhl 2001; Rousseau 1995; Schmedeman and McLean-Parks 1994). Whereas the 
verdicts from several court cases have ruled that the distribution of materials crafted with 
such promissory language may amount to an implied promise of job security (Conner v. 
 
 
 
City of Forest Acres 2002; Hoffman-La Roche, Inc v. Campbell 1987; Pine River State 
Bank v. Mettille 1983; Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield 1980), no one has examined the 
extent to which job security inducements embedded within job-offer letters influences 
recruits’ perceptions of organizational attractiveness and psychological contract obligations. 
Rousseau (1995) suggests that relied-upon promises are the essence of psychological 
contracts.  Organizations  convey  commitments  through  communications  that  indicate 
intentions for the future employee–employer relationship, thus creating a relational contract 
with the employee. Such communications routinely occur during personnel-oriented actions 
(e.g., recruitment) carried out by virtually any organizational agents (Conway and Briner 
2005;  Rousseau  1995).  During  recruitment,  organizational  representatives  tend  to 
emphasize  the  attractiveness  of  the  organization  and  provide  information  to  recruits 
regarding the nature of the job, the organization, and its personnel policies and practices in 
the best possible light. Simultaneously, the recruit integrates this new information into 
evolving knowledge structures and schemas in order to better understand the employment 
relationship (Rousseau 2001). Thus, these types of promises influence the formation of an 
individual’s relational psychological contract and ultimately, the information conveyed 
during the recruiting process may dramatically influence perceptions of organizational 
attractiveness and psychological contract obligations. 
Extant research has demonstrated that policies and procedures conveying an organization’s 
concern for fair treatment to the employee positively influence employee perceptions of 
organizational attractiveness (Schmedeman and McLean-Parks 1994). As such, it is likely that 
the inclusion of language embedded within a job-offer letter implying some degree of job 
security informs recruits that the organization treats its employees in a just way by affording 
employees due process prior to reprimands or discharge. According to the good cause norm, 
recruits are likely to respond to implied promises of job security by reciprocating back to the 
organization in the form of elevated perceptions of attractiveness. By extension, this degree of 
concern for employees should elevate recruits’ perceptions of psychological contract 
obligations. As such, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2a:   The implied promise of job security will increase levels of organizational 
attractiveness relative to a control condition. 
Hypothesis 2b:   The implied promise of job security will increase levels of psychological 
contract obligations relative to a control condition. 
 
Employment at Will X Implied Promises and Employee Outcomes 
 
Problematically, organizations may incorporate both an at-will statement and an implied 
promise clause within recruitment materials (Roehling and Wright 2004). However, 
research has not been carried out investigating the effects of mixed or contradictory 
messages from employers on attractiveness or psychological contract implications. 
According to Rousseau (1995), psychological contract violations occur frequently within 
an organization and can lead to adverse reactions from the employee. Rousseau suggests 
that psychological contracts are likely to be breached due to opportunism, which is defined 
as active, self-serving behavior by one party at the expense of another (Rousseau 1995). 
While organizations often use the job-offer letter as an opportunity to stress the excellence 
of pay, co-workers, benefits, and job advancement, they may also incorporate promissory 
language in order to enhance perceptions of job security and secure the most qualified 
candidates (Arthur 2006; Heneman et al. 1994; Rynes 1991). However, if an organization 
simultaneously uses the job-offer letter as a vehicle for the delivery of an at-will disclaimer, 
 
 
 
recruits may perceive the conflicting messages as the organization’s attempts at 
opportunistic behavior at their expense (Rousseau 1995), thus negating the positive effects 
of the promissory language. 
This inconsistency should affect employee perceptions of the organization. Psychological 
contract theory predicts that it is not the organization’s treatment of the employee per se but the 
discrepancies in actions taken that provide the basis upon which employees interpret the 
reciprocal relationship (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway 2005). A job offer is an attempt by the 
organization to induce an individual into the employment relationship. The offer is the last 
attempt for the organization to present incentives, but it is also an employment document 
within which the employment at-will disclaimer is typically prominently displayed (Arthur 
2006). Thus, the juxtaposition of inducements with a disclaimer makes the job offer-letter a 
key component in the study  of disclaimers.  Based on the above, we hypothesize  that 
contradictory messages (the combination of promissory language with an at-will disclaimer) 
will lower recruits perceptions of both organizational attractiveness and organizational 
psychological contract obligations. 
Hypothesis 3a: The combination of the implied promise of job security and an at-will 
disclaimer will lower perceptions of organizational attractiveness relative 
to a control condition. 
Hypothesis 3b: The combination of the implied promise of job security and an at-will 
disclaimer will lower perceptions of psychological contract obligations 
relative to a control condition. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Prior to beginning this study, university institutional review board (IRB) approval was 
obtained. Participants were 243 senior-level undergraduate business students at a mid-sized 
southeastern university, who were enrolled in a strategic management course during their 
final semester in college. Students were recruited during class time and asked to take part in 
this study in exchange for course credit. During the informed consent process, students 
were informed that they were not required to participate and that no penalty would be 
incurred for refusing. During the data collection process, participants were asked to provide 
their names on a cover sheet attached to the study packet in order to assign course credit. 
Once this information was logged, the cover sheet was discarded, thus preserving 
participant anonymity and confidentiality. The mean age of the participants was 22.8 and 
the sample was 63.5% female and 85.7% Caucasian, 10.8% African American, and 3.5% 
categorized as either Asian, Hispanic, Native American, or Other. Seventy-nine percent of 
the participants reported being actively involved in a job search at the time of the study. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were asked to play the part of an applicant interested in obtaining a position at 
a fictitious organization. The motivation of participants to answer carefully was of high 
importance to this study. Thus, in order to maximize applicant attraction and interest in this 
position, a pilot study was conducted prior to focal study initiation. For the purpose of the 
pilot study, a separate sample from the same population (N =92) was presented with four 
 
 
 
fictitious positions differing on job tasks, necessary skills, and organizational culture and 
asked to rate each on its attractiveness. The position that ranked highest among the pilot 
study  sample  (M=5.2  on  a  7-point  scale)  was  employed  for  use  in  the  focal  study. 
Participants in the focal study were presented with a thorough description of the position, 
the company, its culture, and the coworkers and clients with which one would be working. 
Participants for the focal study were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions under 
study. In this 2×2 between-subjects design, each participant was presented with three job offer 
letters; two dummy letters and one randomly assigned experimental letter. Research in the area 
of decision making has shown that the choice set (alternatives available from which to choose) 
has a significant and substantial impact on how decision-makers evaluate alternatives (Hastie 
and Dawes 2001).  The  inclusion  of  dummy  letters  serves  to  anchor  the  participants’ 
perceptions of the experimental letter and ensures a common frame of reference across 
experimental conditions. Moreover, given the nature of the subject pool, it was thought that a 
stand-alone offer letter would have restricted the range of responses, as college seniors are 
likely to rate any single job opportunity favorable, given the currently poor economic 
conditions and dour job outlook for new business graduates. Thus, giving participants a 
comparative tool with which to judge attractiveness likely increases the variance in responses. 
The first dummy letter (Appendix A) included an elevated annual salary (10% above the 
experimental salary) and the use of a company car. This offer was constructed to be a more 
attractive offer than the experimental letter. The second dummy letter (Appendix B) included 
a lower annual salary (10% below the experimental salary) and the requirement of extensive 
travel. This offer was constructed to be less attractive than the experimental letter. The four 
experimental letters were constructed in such a way as to present participants with a mid-level 
salary and average benefits. The experimental salary was set at the mean starting salary of the 
university’s business graduates, as determined by a survey of recent graduates. Each of the 
experimental letters included the same benefits and compensation package and varied only 
with respect to inclusion of at-will disclaimers and an implied promise of job security. 
The explicit employment at-will condition (Appendix C) contained the inclusion of an 
at-will disclaimer at the end of the offer letter but before the signature line. The disclaimer 
was as follows: “This letter does not constitute a contract. Our Company adheres to a policy 
of employment at-will. Your employment and compensation can be terminated, with or 
without cause, and with or without notice, at any time.” This language was crafted based on 
a combination of 11 actual job offer letters solicited from graduating students and language 
recommended in employment law textbooks (e.g., Rothstein and Liebman 2003). 
The implied promise of job security condition (Appendix D) included the following 
statement: “We are sure you will come to value the long-lasting relationship you develop 
with your colleagues. This is a company in which you can stay and grow. We hope this is 
the beginning of a long, rewarding, and mutually prosperous relationship.” This statement, 
based on similar language found in six of the 11 job offer letters obtained, was included in 
the first paragraph of the offer letter. 
The combined at-will/implied promise condition (Appendix E) employed a job offer 
letter in which both of the aforementioned manipulations were embedded. Lastly, the 
control group participants received the same general letter as the experimental conditions, 
save the aforementioned manipulations (Appendix F). 
Dummy letters were presented first to participants, followed by presentation of the 
experimental letter. Participants were asked to assume the role of offeree and respond to 
specific questions regarding the attractiveness of the offer, participant’s psychological 
contract formation, demographic information, and manipulation checks only in response to 
the experimental letter, which was read last. 
 
 
 
Measures 
 
Organizational Attraction Highhouse et  al. (2003)  15-item measure  of organizational 
attractiveness was used. This measure taps one’s perceptions of organizational attractive- 
ness and prestige, as well as behavioral intentions to accept a job offer. This measure has 
demonstrated superior levels of construct validity (Highhouse et al. 2003). A sample item 
reads “A job at this company is very appealing to me” and is rated on a 7-point Strongly 
Disagree-Strongly Agree Likert-type scale. 
 
Psychological Contract Formation The present study assessed the perceptions of the potential 
employment relationship using a 3-item measure taken from Rousseau’s (1990) scale. The scale 
composed items measuring the extent to which respondents felt the organization would be 
obligated to them to provide training, long-term job security, and career development. Past 
research that has drawn items from this scale has demonstrated acceptable levels of construct- and 
criterion-related validity associated with this measure (Robinson 1996; Robinson et al. 1994). A 
sample item reads “To what extent do you believe this organization is obligated to provide you 
with long-term job security?” and is rated on a 5-point Not at all-Very Highly Likert-type scale. 
 
Manipulation Checks Three yes/no questions were used to assess the effectiveness of the 
manipulation in the experimental letter. The first, second, and third manipulation checks 
asked participants whether they realized that they could be fired at any time, whether the 
offer letter implied a promise of job security, and whether the offer letter contradicted an 
implied promise with an employment-at-will clause, respectively. 
 
 
 
Results 
 
The means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities of all variables used in the study are 
presented in Table 1. 
Subjecting each of the three manipulation checks to 4×2 (Condition: Employment at-will 
disclaimer only, implied promise only, combined employment at-will disclaimer/implied 
promise, and control X Yes/No) chi-square goodness-of-fit tests revealed the following: For the 
first manipulation check, awareness of the employment at-will disclaimer, the omnibus chi- 
square test indicated that participants differentially understood that they could be fired at any 
time according to condition, χ2(3, 242)=12.90, p<.01. A post-hoc cell contribution analysis, a 
form of standardized residual that determines what each cell contributes to the chi-square 
analysis (Tabachnik and Fidell 2001), indicated that the observed significant difference is due 
to those in the at-will disclaimer condition perceiving an at-will disclaimer at a higher 
proportion than those in the other conditions (p<.05). 
 
Table 1  Means, standard deviations, correlations, and alpha reliabilities of study variables. 
 
Variables Mean SD α r 
Study Variables 
1. Organizational Attraction 
 
 
4.62 
 
 
0.82 
 
 
.91 
 
2. Psychological Contract Obligations 3.04 0.81 .86 0.52** 
α = alpha reliabilities; **p<.01     
 
 
 
For the second manipulation check, awareness of implied job security, the overall chi- 
square statistic was again significant, χ2 (3, 242)=15.43, p<.01, indicating differences in 
perceptions of implied job security by condition. Inspection of the standardized residuals 
demonstrated that those in the implied promise condition perceived an implication of job 
security at a higher rate than those in the other conditions (p<.05). 
Lastly, the third manipulation check, awareness of a contradiction between an 
employment at-will disclaimer and an implied promise, was also statistically significant, 
χ2 (3, 242)=8.88, p<.05. Analysis of the standardized residuals indicated that those in the 
employment-at-will/implied promise condition recognized an embedded contradiction at a 
marginally significantly higher rate that those in the other conditions (p<.07). 
Overall, the results of the manipulation checks independently indicate that our planned 
manipulations functioned as forecasted and that conclusions drawn from the following 
analyses are likely valid. 
Our sample was heavily weighted with female participants who were asked to report to 
female executives per our simulated job  offer letter. Relational demography research 
suggests that individuals tend to be drawn to those who are demographically similar to 
themselves, even in a recruitment context (Martins and Parsons 2007; Tsui and O’Reilly 
1989). Thus, prior to running our focal analyses, we sought to investigate any gender-based 
differences on our dependent variables. No gender differences were found for 
organizational attraction across males (M=4.51) and females (M=4.64), t(241)=1.38, 
p=ns. Similarly, psychological contract obligations were not significantly different across 
males (M=3.01) and females (M=3.06), t(241)=0.64, p=ns. 
For our focal analyses, one-way between-groups analyses of variance, followed by Least 
Significant Differences (LSD) post hoc tests, were conducted to explore the impact of 
employment at-will disclaimers and implied promises of job security on organizational 
attractiveness and psychological contract obligations (See Table 2). There was a significant 
difference in organizational attractiveness across conditions F(3, 242)=7.28, p<.001, as 
well as a significant difference in psychological contract obligations across the experimental 
conditions F(3, 242)=2.73, p<.05. 
Post-hoc comparisons (Table 2) indicated that the mean scores on organizational 
attractiveness for the employment at-will disclaimer condition (M=4.21, SD =.81) was 
significantly lower than that of the control condition (M=4.78, SD=.65), thus providing 
support for Hypothesis 1a. Furthermore, the mean score on psychological contract 
obligations was significantly lower for respondents in the employment at-will disclaimer 
 
Table 2  Means for dependent variables by experimental condition. 
 
Dependent Variable Condition  
 EAW (N =60) IP (N=59) Control (N=62) EAW X IP (N=62) 
Organizational Attraction     
M 
SD 
4.21a 
0.81 
5.21b 
0.87 
4.78abc 
0.65 
4.34c 
0.93 
Psychological Contract Obligations 
M 2.81b 3.24 3.26bc 2.89c 
SD 0.84 .93 0.70 0.65 
Means with the same subscript across dependent variable denote a-priori specified statistically significant 
differences at p<.05; EAW = Employment at will; IP = Implied Promise 
 
 
 
relative to those in the control condition (M=2.81, SD =.84 and M =3.26, SD=.70, 
respectively), supporting Hypothesis 1b. 
In addition, in support of Hypothesis 2a, mean levels of organizational attractiveness 
were significantly higher for those in the implied promise of job security condition (M= 
5.14, SD=.77) compared to those in the control condition (M=4.78, SD =.65). However, 
mean levels of psychological contract obligations did not differ across the implied promise 
of job security condition and control condition (M=3.24, SD =.93 and M=3.26, SD=.70, 
respectively), refuting Hypothesis 2b. 
The combination of the implied promise of job security and an at-will disclaimer did 
significantly lower perceptions of organizational attractiveness relative to the control 
condition (M=4.34, SD =.93 and M=4.78, SD=.65, respectively), supporting Hypothesis 
3a. Lastly, Hypothesis 3b was supported as the combination of the implied promise of job 
security and an at-will disclaimer did result in significantly decreased levels of 
psychological contract obligations relative to the control condition (M=2.89, SD=.65 and 
M=3.26, SD=.70, respectively). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
It has been suggested that a legalistic approach in preventing implied contract claims has 
negative implications for a firm’s attractiveness (Roehling and Wright 2004). The inclusion 
of disclaimers to avoid potential costly litigation may bring costs not previously anticipated 
by the employer. These costs are associated with a firm’s ability to attract employees. 
Indeed, Schwoerer  and Rosen (1989) and Roehling and Winters (2000)  showed that 
communication of an employment at-will policy decreased both ratings of a firm’s 
attractiveness and the subject’s intentions to pursue a job opportunity with that firm. This 
study sought to extend the extant research on the effects of recruitment-related 
communications to later stages of the recruitment process—the job offer letter—by 
investigating the effects of employment at-will disclaimers, implied promises, and the 
combination of the two on measures of organizational attractiveness and perceptions of 
organizational psychological contract obligations. 
In accordance with previous research (Roehling and Winters 2000; Schwoerer and 
Rosen 1989), the findings of the current study indicate that an organization may be at a 
disadvantage by including an employment at-will disclaimer. The current study investigated 
the effects of an at-will disclaimer at the final, and most high-profile, stage of recruitment, 
the job offer letter. Our results suggest that participants could correctly identify an 
embedded at-will disclaimer in a job offer letter and that the disclaimer decreased ratings of 
organizational attractiveness. Moreover, this study found that perceptions of psychological 
contract obligations were also negatively influenced by the inclusion of at-will disclaimers. 
These results suggest that future job applicants do in fact expect freedom from arbitrary 
discharge and are suspicious of violations of the good cause norm, which might be made 
manifest through the communication of at-will policies in an offer letter. 
Furthermore, our findings also indicate that participants did recognize the inclusion of an 
implied promise of job security embedded within an offer letter and subsequently rated the 
organization as more attractive than those in the control condition. Thus, it appears that the 
implication of job security rights may afford an organization a dramatic advantage in 
recruitment efforts with respect to organizational attractiveness. Conversely, participants in 
the implied promise condition were no different than the control condition with respect to 
their perceived psychological obligations from the employer. 
 
 
 
Participants in the combination implied promise and employment at-will condition 
correctly identified that there was a contradiction between an implied promise of job 
security and a statement negating job security. Interestingly, our results suggest that the 
positive influence of an implied promise on organizational attractiveness is negated by the 
inclusion of an at-will disclaimer. Thus, it would appear that the inclusion of an implied 
promise of job security does little to elevate levels of organizational attraction when 
presented simultaneously with an at-will disclaimer. Taken together, the results of this study 
offer some intriguing implications. 
For example, given our experimental findings, some might question the wisdom of 
including any form of employment-at-will statement in organizational materials. While a clear 
employment-at-will statement might serve to lessen an organization’s vulnerability to legal 
challenge and help defend it against implied-contract charges initiated by terminated 
employees, researchers have begun to advocate embedding this legalistic approach within a 
broader and more strategic organizationally-sensible approach that provides a balanced focus 
on minimizing legal risks and maximizing organizational rewards (Roehling and Wright 2004). 
Employees are increasingly willing to speak out and act on issues related to workplace 
sensitivity and organizational justice (Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002). Thus, for recruitment 
purposes, an important component of organizational employment policy would seem to be a 
guarantee of protection from arbitrary treatment by management. Unfortunately however, this 
practice is simply imprudent from an organizational perspective. For legal purposes, 
management would wish to reserve the right to terminate at will. 
Ultimately, human resource planners are faced with this contradiction: Recruiting 
materials (such as job offer letters) that emphasize respect for employee rights and due 
process may communicate a degree of job security and increase levels of organizational 
attraction. However a clear statement of corporate adherence to the employment-at-will 
doctrine may limit litigation against the organization, yet communicate less long-term 
security and thereby reduce levels of organizational attraction and perceptions of 
psychological contract obligations. In order to strike a balance between the two concerns, 
it seems that corporate human resource specialists must learn to draft employment policies 
that cater to the demands of applicants who require assurances of due process while 
simultaneously preserving the organization’s legal rights. 
Human resource professionals might find value in harnessing the behavioral sciences 
literature and psychological contract research literature to assist in crafting suitable 
language for written contracts that help create clear expectations that clarify the 
organization’s stance on employment-at-will and at the same time minimize the occurrences 
of negative experiences that lead to employee turnover or litigation (Rousseau 1998; 
Roehling and Boswell 2004; Suazo et al. 2009). For example, Turnley and Feldman (1999) 
found that the provision of adequate justification lessened the negative impact that 
psychological contract breach had on turnover intentions. These results suggest that the 
negative effects of psychological contract transgressions may be dampened, if not 
eliminated altogether, through selective and effective communications that strike an 
appropriate, conciliatory tone. To our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists to provide 
this type of guidance to human resources practitioners, thus future research should 
investigate whether optimal job offer language can be constructed that will simultaneously 
preserve the employer’s at-will rights without undermining the positive aspects of job 
security which the employer may wish to convey. 
Our contradictory findings with regard to the influence of an implied promise of job 
security are also intriguing, from both theoretical and practical perspectives. While we 
found that an implied promise positively influenced organizational attraction, contrary to 
 
 
 
our expectations, we found no effect for an implied promise on psychological contract 
obligations. We believe these results may stem from the relative time it takes for 
perceptions of organizational attraction and psychological contract obligations to form. 
Much research indicates that characteristics of the recruiter, recruitment materials, and 
recruitment techniques have immediate proximal effects on applicant attraction (Allen et al. 
2004, 2007; Barber 1998), indicating that applicants determine their levels of attraction 
relatively quickly. As a result we might expect recruits to report increased perceptions of 
organizational attraction as a result of implied promises. 
In contrast to the rapidity with which attraction perceptions are formed, Rousseau (2001) 
argues that relational contracts are built over successive interactions with organizational 
agents who make, either implicitly or explicitly, promises of job security. This logic would 
suggest that perceptions of organizational psychological contract obligations are likely 
relatively uninfluenced until one’s mental model of the relational contract is formed. When 
compared to longer-tenured employees, recruits have fewer interactions with organizational 
agents and less exposure to organizational communications; thus, it may be unlikely that 
stable relational contract schema have had sufficient time to fully form for these 
individuals. Consequently, perceptions of organizational psychological contract obligations 
may be little influenced by promissory language embedded within recruits’ job offer letters. 
Instead, these perceptions may be incrementally influenced over the entire socialization and 
organizational entry processes (Schein 2000) as new members encounter organizational 
policies and practices that influence the formation of the relational contract. 
While more research is required to ensure the appropriateness of this interpretation 
(specifically longitudinal investigations of recruits’ relational contract formation), our findings 
demonstrating that psychological contract obligations were significantly lower for those in the 
at-will condition and the combined at-will/implied promise condition indicate that psychological 
contract breaches may occur very early on in the schema-building process. If this interpretation is 
accurate, it would indicate that long-term commitment intimated by promissory language in the 
job offer letter has little effect on one’s perception of organizational obligations to the employee; 
yet explicit employment-at-will language dramatically decreases these perceptions before 
organizational entry. One might expect these effects for at-will language; an at-will clause is 
essentially a statement meant to set forth at an early stage a contract agreement between recruit 
and organization. In this sense, at-will disclaimers make immediate and explicit for the recruit 
the relational contract, effectively eliminating the schema building latency period. As outlined by 
Rousseau (2001), relational contract schema are relatively durable and fairly resistant to 
change once established, making even more salient the need for at-will language that can 
successfully mollify recruit concerns over due process, yet provide the organization will the 
necessary legal protections. 
Lastly, whereas this study investigated perceptions of organizational contract obligations in 
a decidedly American context, there is evidence that HRM practices influence psychological 
contract formation and employee expectations internationally. For example, perceived 
psychological breaches related to HRM policy have been found to influence the extent to 
which Chinese employees engage in destructive behavioral responses including disloyalty, 
neglecting job duties, and turnover intentions (Si et al. 2008; Turnley and Feldman 1999). The 
results of these studies are in accord with our results; employees do not react to contract 
violations in passive ways. Many American multinational firms have adopted globally 
consistent policies and practices in order to foster a uniform corporate culture (Briscoe and 
Schuler 2004). Based on the above however, it should be kept in mind that the globally 
consistent application of at-will language in the recruitment process will likely result in 
negative recruit reactions and legal pressure to adapt their practices in different countries. 
 
 
 
Similarly, non-U.S. multinationals should understand how American law impacts both human 
resource decisions and recruit perceptions as research has indicated a clear link between 
perceptions of procedural justice and employee litigation (Harris 2000). A failure to 
appreciate these links can result in the potential for significant liability and human resource 
disputes. Accordingly, both international and multinational companies should pay attention to 
the manner in which materials are prepared and presented to potential employees as 
psychological contact breaches have an influence on the attraction and perceptions of 
valuable human resources, an effect that seems to span national boundaries. 
 
 
Limitations & Future Research 
 
Although our findings have helped to answer recent calls in the recruiting literature, our study 
did have several limitations. For example, one limitation of this study was our use of a student 
sample, which limits generalizability. While our sample was composed of senior-level business 
students who will, in the near future, actively enter the job market and become the target of 
organizational recruitment efforts, use of this sample may have nevertheless restricted the range 
on relevant variables. Future researchers should attempt to replicate our results on actual job 
applicants with more work experience to ensure the generalizability of our findings. In a related 
vein, future research should also examine the reaction of experienced employees, especially 
those who have experienced terminations due to mergers, acquisitions or corporate downsizing. 
Studying experienced employees might serve to alleviate the possibility that the setting, in this 
case a classroom, either increased or decreased the salience of information regarding at-will 
policies. In addition, empirical evidence has suggested that broader group-level variables such 
as job category (mid-managers, lower-level managers, and non-managers) systematically 
impacts perceptions of the employee–employer relationship (Bae and Lawler 2000; Wang et al. 
2003). As such, one might expect that higher-level grouping variables (i.e., job category or 
occupation) should augment or attenuate the effects of at-will language on organizational 
attraction or psychological contract obligations.  Future research should also investigate 
group-level influences on our dependent variables. 
We also wish to emphasize that our hypothesis testing was conducted in a cross-sectional 
manner, which limits our ability to gauge the lasting effects of implied promises  or 
perceived breaches of the psychological contract. There is empirical evidence to suggest 
that psychological contract breaches influences turnover, task performance, and 
organizational citizenship behavior for many months to come (Bunderson 2001; 
Robinson 1996). Future research should investigate in a longitudinal sense the negative 
ramifications of embedded at-will disclaimers and perceptions of psychological contract 
breaches to discern at what point the effects of these violations abate. Another 
methodological issue that should be noted is nature of the language in our simulated 
letters. We included various incentives (i.e., pay at 10% above the mean, the use of a 
company car) in the first dummy letter in order to construct a more attractive offer than 
the experimental letter, thereby anchoring participant perceptions. However, to the extent 
that a) the offer of a company car was seen as unrealistic or b) students perceive that they 
are deserving of an above-average salary, our results may have been skewed. Future 
research should consider the influence of such incentives and carefully craft language 
accordingly. Lastly, validity with which we measured psychological contract obligations 
may be an issue. While this scale has been shown to be both reliable and valid 
(Robinson 1996; Robinson et al. 1994), the use of a three-item measure may fail to 
adequately tap the entire psychological contract obligations domain, thus raising questions 
about its content validity. 
 
 
 
Moreover, in order to further our understanding of the effects of employment-at-will 
disclaimers and implied promises on important organizational outcomes, future research should 
investigate other potential moderating variables such as equity sensitivity (Huseman et al. 1987), 
negative affectivity Watson and Clark (1984)), Machiavellianism (Dahling et al. 2009), or 
cultural differences (Kiesler and Sproull 1982) that may serve to sensitize or immunize the 
effects of employment at-will disclaimers and implied promises of job security. Given the 
subjective nature of psychological contracts and implied promises, it is likely that their 
fulfillment and/or violation are viewed quite differently, depending on characteristics of the 
perceiver. Likewise, future research might examine whether the inclusion of at-will disclaimers 
undermines the credibility of other positive messages the employer attempts to convey 
(regarding, for example, environmental friendliness, corporate responsibility, and others), or 
whether the effect of at-will disclaimers is limited to concerns related to job security. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
ABC would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At ABC, we value each and every one of our employees. 
 
Your initial compensation package includes a yearly salary of $47,915.83 and full 
medical and dental coverage through our company's employee benefit plan. In addition to 
this generous compensation package you will also be given a company car. You will be 
classified as an exempt executive-level employee. After 90 days you will become eligible to 
participate in ABC’s 401 (k) program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. After completion of our six-week orientation and training program for new 
executives, you will report directly to Cynthia Coates. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Walter Wilson 
Senior Vice-President 
ABC Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
DEF would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At DEF, we value each and every one of our employees. 
 
You will be classified as an exempt executive-level employee. Your initial 
compensation package includes full dental and medical coverage and an annual salary 
of $39,203.21. After 90 days you will be eligible for participation in DEF’s 401 (k) 
program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. This position will require extensive travel and long hours. After completion 
of our six-week orientation and training program for new executives, you will report 
directly to Debra Donahue. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Steve Stephenson 
Senior Vice-President 
DEF Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
GHI would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At GHI, we value each and every one of our employees. 
 
The beginning compensation package for this position includes an annual salary of 
$43,559.12, and full medical and dental coverage through our company's employee benefit 
plan. You will be classified as an exempt executive level employee. After 90 days you will 
be eligible for participation in GHI’s 401 (k) program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. After completion of our six-week orientation and training program for new 
executives, you will report directly to Holly Hamilton. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
 
This letter does not constitute a contract. Our company adheres to a policy of 
employment at-will. Your employment and compensation  can be terminated, with  or 
without cause, and with or without notice, at any time. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Joe Johnson 
Senior Vice-President 
GHI Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
GHI would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At GHI, we value each and every one of our employees. We are sure you will 
come to value the long-lasting relationship you develop with your colleagues. This is a 
company in which you can stay and grow. We hope this is the beginning of a long, 
rewarding, and mutually prosperous relationship. 
 
The beginning compensation package for this position includes an annual salary of 
$43,559.12, and full medical and dental coverage through our company's employee benefit 
plan. You will be classified as an exempt executive level employee. After 90 days you will 
be eligible for participation in GHI’s 401 (k) program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. After completion of our six-week orientation and training program for new 
executives, you will report directly to Holly Hamilton. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Joe Johnson 
Senior Vice-President 
GHI Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
 
 
 
Appendix E 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
GHI would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At GHI, we value each and every one of our employees. We are sure you will 
come to value the long-lasting relationship you develop with your colleagues. This is a 
company in which you can stay and grow. We hope this is the beginning of a long, 
rewarding, and mutually prosperous relationship. 
 
The beginning compensation package for this position includes an annual salary of 
$43,559.12, and full medical and dental coverage through our company's employee benefit 
plan. You will be classified as an exempt executive level employee. After 90 days you will 
be eligible for participation in GHI’s 401 (k) program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. After completion of our six-week orientation and training program for new 
executives, you will report directly to Holly Hamilton. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
 
This letter does not constitute a contract. Our company adheres to a policy of 
employment at-will. Your employment and compensation  can be terminated, with  or 
without cause, and with or without notice, at any time. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Joe Johnson 
Senior Vice-President 
GHI Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
Ms. / Mr. Applicant 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC, 28607 
 
Dear Ms. / Mr. Applicant: 
 
GHI would like to offer you the position of (assume this is a position you desire) in our 
organization. At GHI, we value each and every one of our employees. 
 
The beginning compensation package for this position includes an annual salary of 
$43,559.12, and full medical and dental coverage through our company's employee benefit 
plan. You will be classified as an exempt executive level employee. After 90 days you will 
be eligible for participation in GHI’s 401 (k) program. 
 
As we discussed during your interviews, you will be assigned to our corporate 
headquarters. After completion of our six-week orientation and training program for new 
executives, you will report directly to Holly Hamilton. 
 
Please let me know if you have any questions. We look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Joe Johnson 
Senior Vice-President 
GHI Company, Inc. 
 
If you accept our offer, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to my attention. 
 
 
 
Signature Date 
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